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Abstract
A concept of bypass rewiring is introduced and random bypass rewiring is analytically and
numerically investigated with simulations. Our results show that bypass rewiring makes networks
robust against removal of nodes including random failures and attacks. In particular, random
bypass rewiring connects all nodes except the removed nodes on an even degree infinite network
and makes the percolation threshold 0 for arbitrary occupation probabilities. In our example, the
even degree network is more robust than the original network with random bypass rewiring while
the original network is more robust than the even degree networks without random bypass. We
propose a greedy bypass rewiring algorithm which guarantees the maximum size of the largest
component at each step, assuming which node will be removed next is unknown. The simulation
result shows that the greedy bypass rewiring algorithm improves the robustness of the autonomous
system of the Internet under attacks more than random bypass rewiring.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 64.60.ah, 05.10.-a
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many real world systems (the Internet, electric power grids, the World Wide Web, social
networks, urban streets, airline routes, subway, and others) are represented by complex net-
works with many nodes and many links between nodes [1–13]. A network (graph) breaks
into small disconnected parts when nodes are deleted. Complex networks are robust against
random failures or errors (random removal of nodes) but fragile and vulnerable to (inten-
tional) attacks (targeted removal of nodes in decreasing order of degree from the highest
degree) [1–3, 5, 7–10, 13–16]. There are various mitigation methods which make networks
more robust [12, 17–19]. However, there are geographical, economic, and technical problems
to implement the mitigation methods known so far. Therefore, we propose a concept of
bypass rewiring to make networks robust against random failures and attacks.
II. A CONCEPT OF BYPASS REWIRING
A node in Fig. 1(a) is removed by random failures or attacks and turns into the removed
node in Fig. 1(b). Bypass rewiring is to directly connect each pair of links of the removed
node like Fig. 1(c). Each pair of links for rewiring can be chosen in various ways including
random selection like random bypass rewiring and heuristic methods like greedy bypass
rewiring algorithm. If the degree of the removed node is odd, one link remains open. For
example, an engineer or equipment can simply rewire cables (links) of a router (node) on
the Internet (network) and relay (and sometimes amplify) the signals directly when the
router does not work under random failures or attacks. Since repair is generally harder
than rewiring, bypass rewiring would be a more useful and simpler way to improve the
connectivity of the other part of the network except the broken router while the router does
not work or is under repair.
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III. RANDOM BYPASS REWIRING
In this paper, we use generating functions based on the generating function formalism
introduced in Refs. [4, 13, 14, 20]. We define
G0(x) =
∞∑
k=0
pkx
k, (1)
G1(x) =
∑
∞
k=1 kpkx
k−1
∑
∞
k=1 kpk
=
∞∑
k=0
qkx
k, (2)
H1(x) =
∞∑
k=0
hkx
k, (3)
where pk is the probability that a randomly chosen node has degree k and hk is the probability
that a randomly chosen link reaches a small component which has k nodes. In Eq. (2), qk is
the probability that a randomly chosen link reaches a node with degree k + 1. Since nodes
of the giant component do not belong to any small component which has a fixed number of
nodes on an infinite network, the probability that a randomly chosen node belongs to the
giant component is
S =
∞∑
k=0
pkφk{1− [H1(1)]
k} =
∞∑
k=0
pkφk(1− u
k), (4)
for
H1(x) =
∞∑
k=0
qk{1− φk+1 + φk+1[H1(x)]
k}, (5)
H1(1) = u = f1(u) =
∞∑
k=0
qk(1− φk+1 + φk+1u
k), (6)
where φk is the occupation probability that a randomly chosen node with degree k is not
removed and u is the smallest non-negative real solution of Eq. (6), that is, u is the average
probability that a randomly chosen link is not connected to the giant component [3, 13, 14].
The average occupation probability is
φ =
∞∑
k=0
pkφk. (7)
3
Based on the idea seen in Fig. 2, H1(x) and u satisfy
H1(x) = q0φ1x+ q0(1− φ1) + q1φ2xH1(x) + q1(1− φ2)H1(x) + q2φ3x[H1(x)]
2
+
2
3
q2(1− φ3)H1(x) +
1
3
q2(1− φ3) + · · ·
=
∞∑
k=0
qkφk+1x[H1(x)]
k +H1(x)
∞∑
k=0
qk(1− φk+1)
+[1−H1(x)]
∞∑
k=0
p2k+1(1− φ2k+1)∑
∞
k′=1 k
′pk′
, (8)
u = f2(u) =
∞∑
k=0
qkφk+1u
k + u
∞∑
k=0
qk(1− φk+1) + (1− u)
∞∑
k=0
p2k+1(1− φ2k+1)∑
∞
k′=1 k
′pk′
, (9)
when random bypass rewiring is applied to an infinite network. In the case of random
failures (φk = φ), Eq. (9) corresponds to
u = f3(u) = φ
∞∑
k=0
qku
k + (1− φ)u+ (1− u)(1− φ)
∞∑
k=0
p2k+1∑
∞
k′=1 k
′pk′
. (10)
The self-consistent equations like Eqs. (6) and (9) can be solved as follows by the fixed-
point iteration, which is a numerical method [21]. Iterating
ui+1 = f1(ui), (11a)
vi+1 = f2(vi), (11b)
for u0 = v0 = 0, ui and vi approaches to u¯ and v¯, respectively, as i goes to infinity, for
u¯ = f1(u¯), (12a)
v¯ = f2(v¯). (12b)
Since the right-hand side of Eq. (6) is equal to or larger than the right-hand side of Eq. (9)
for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1,
ui ≥ vi, (13)
is satisfied for all i. Therefore, S with random bypass rewiring is always equal to or larger
than without random bypass rewiring; that is, the percolation threshold with random bypass
rewiring is always equal to or smaller than without random bypass rewiring.
To simulate attacks, a node with the highest degree is firstly removed and nodes are
removed one by one in decreasing order of degree while randomly chosen nodes are removed
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one by one in case of random failures. In the simulation, the degree of each node is not
recalculated while nodes are removed. To simulate random bypass rewiring, each pair of
links of the removed node are randomly chosen and rewired until no or one link remains.
For
p2k+1 = 0, (14)
the smallest non-negative real solution of Eq. (9) is u = 0 since the last term of the right
side of Eq. (9) is 0. The smallest non-negative real solution of Eq. (10) is also u = 0 for
the same reason. Therefore, S is equal to φ, and the percolation threshold is 0 on an even
degree infinite network with random bypass rewiring for arbitrary φk. In other words, even
degree networks randomly generated are extremely robust against removal of nodes including
random failures and attacks with random bypass rewiring. Figure 3(b) shows that almost all
the nodes except the removed nodes on the even degree network are connected by random
bypass rewiring. Every percolation threshold with random bypass rewiring in Fig. 3(b) is 0,
while every percolation threshold in Fig. 3(a) is not.
The even degree network for Fig. 3(b) is randomly generated by degree distribution
p′2k = p2k + p2k+1 where pk is the degree distribution of the original network for Fig. 3(a).
For this reason, the original network has more links and larger average degree than the even
degree network has. Without random bypass rewiring, the size of the largest component
and S on the original network is larger than on the even degree network, respectively. On
the other hand, with random bypass rewiring, the size of the largest component and S on
the even degree network are larger than on the original network, respectively, as seen in
Fig. 3. In other words, the even degree network is more robust than the original network
with random bypass rewiring, while the original network is more robust than the even degree
network without random bypass rewiring.
IV. GREEDY BYPASS REWIRING
We propose a greedy bypass rewiring algorithm to improve robustness of networks against
removal of nodes including random failures and attacks. The algorithm chooses a pair of
link, based on the number of the links not yet rewired and the size of the neighboring
components.
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A removed node with degree k has k neighbor nodes (neighbor 1, neighbor 2, . . . , neighbor
k) and k links (link 1, link 2, . . . , link k). Ri denotes whether link i is rewired (Ri = 1) or
not yet rewired (Ri = 0). Initially, set Ri = 0 for all i at each step. Ti,j denotes whether
neighbor i and neighbor j belong to the same component (Ti,j = 1) or do not (Ti,j = 0),
that is, there exists a path from neighbor i to neighbor j without going through the removed
node or does not. Ti,i = 1 is trivially satisfied for all i, and
Qi =
k∑
j=1
Ti,j(1− Rj) (15)
denotes how many links in the component to which neighbor i belongs are not yet rewired. Si
denotes the size of the component to which neighbor i belongs. At t-th step for 1 ≤ t ≤ ⌊k
2
⌋,
choose α′ which satisfies Rα′ = 0 and Qα′ ≥ Qi with Ri = 0 for all i. From chosen α
′,
choose α which satisfies Rα = 0, Qα = Qα′ , and Sα ≥ Si with Ri = 0 and Qi = Qα′ for all
i. Update Rα = 1. If Ti,j = 1 is satisfied for all i and j, choose randomly β which satisfies
Rβ = 0 without choice of β
′. Otherwise, choose β ′ which satisfies Rβ′ = 0, Tα,β′ = 0,
Qβ′ ≥ Qi with Ri = 0 and Tα,i = 0 for all i. From chosen β
′, choose β which satisfies
Rβ = 0, Tα,β = 0, Qβ = Qβ′, and Sβ ≥ Si with Ri = 0, Tα,i = 0, and Qi = Qβ′ for all i.
Update Rβ = 1. When neighbor α and neighbor β do not belong to the same component
(Tα,β = 0), update the size of the component to which neighbor α and neighbor β belong,
that is, Si = [1− (1− Tα,i)(1− Tβ,i)](Sα + Sβ) for all i. Update Ti,j = Tj,i = 1 if there exist
i and j which satisfy Ti,αTβ,j = 1, that is, Ti,j = Tj,i = 1 − (1 − Ti,j)(1 − Ti,αTβ,j). Repeat
each step of the algorithm ⌊k
2
⌋ times whenever a node is removed.
If there exists i ( 6= α, β) which satisfies Qi > 1, the maximum size of the largest compo-
nent is not guaranteed for Qα ≤ 1 or Qβ ≤ 1. From this aspect, we choose α
′ and β ′ 6= α
which maximize Qα′ and Qβ′ in the algorithm. If Qi ≤ 1 is satisfied for all i ( 6= α), the
maximum size of the largest component is not guaranteed when there exists i which satisfies
Sβ < Si. If Qi ≤ 1 is satisfied for all i, the maximum size of the largest component is not
guaranteed when there exists i which satisfies Sα < Si or Sβ < Si. From this point of view,
we choose α and β ( 6= α) which maximize Sα and Sβ in the algorithm for Qα = Qα′ and
Qβ = Qβ′. Therefore, the algorithm guarantees the maximum size of the largest component
at each step where which node will be removed next is unknown.
Figure 4 shows that the greedy bypass rewiring algorithm improves the robustness of the
Internet and the electrical power grid under attacks more than random bypass rewiring.
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Since we ignore and eliminate self links and double links for the simulation, the number of
links on the Internet is 12572 where the network originally has 13895 links.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, we have introduced a concept of bypass rewiring and analytically and numer-
ically investigated random bypass rewiring with simulations. The results have shown that
random bypass rewiring improves robustness of networks under removal of nodes including
random failures and attacks. With random bypass rewiring, all nodes except the removed
nodes on an even degree infinite network are connected for arbitrary occupation probabili-
ties, and then the percolation threshold is 0. With (without) random bypass rewiring, the
size of the largest component and S on the original network are smaller (larger) than on the
even degree network randomly generated by the degree distribution p′2k = p2k+p2k+1, respec-
tively, where pk is the degree distribution of the original network. This means that random
bypass rewiring makes even degree networks extremely robust. Based on the number of the
links not yet rewired and the size of the neighboring components, we have proposed a greedy
bypass rewiring algorithm which guarantees the maximum size of the largest component at
each step, assuming that which node will be removed next is unknown. The simulation
result has shown that the algorithm improves robustness of the autonomous system of the
Internet more than random bypass rewiring. We hope that bypass rewiring equipment is
implemented and added on the existing routers on the Internet. More applications of various
kinds and studies of bypass rewiring in many fields are expected.
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(a) (b) (c)
FIG. 1. A circle is for a node and squares are for components. (a) Before removal of the node, one
node and five components are connected. (b) After removal of the node, the network fragments
into five smaller components without bypass rewiring. (c) After removal of the node, the network
fragments into two larger components and one smaller component with bypass rewiring.
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FIG. 2. A schematic diagram to calculate the probability that a component (square) is reached by
a randomly chosen link with random bypass rewiring under removal of a node (circle).
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FIG. 3. The size of the largest component with respect to the number of removed nodes under
random failures [circles (plus signs)] and attacks [squares (crosses)] without (with) random bypass
rewiring. The solid lines are for numerically calculated S with respect toN(1−φ) from Eqs. (4), (6),
(9), and (10) on an infinite network with the same degree distribution. (a) On the undirected scale-
free network randomly generated by the configuration model with degree distribution pk ∼ k
−3,
N = 20000 nodes, and M = 30719 links. (b) On the undirected even degree scale-free network
randomly generated by the configuration model with degree distribution p′2k = p2k + p2k+1, N =
20000 nodes, and M = 28160 links. Two straight lines for random bypass rewiring are overlapped.
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FIG. 4. The circles are for the case without bypass rewiring. The squares (crosses) are for the
case with random (greedy) bypass rewiring. (a) The size of the largest component with respect to
the number of removed nodes on the autonomous system (AS-733) from [22] with N = 6474 nodes
and M = 12572 links under attacks. (b) The size of the largest component with respect to the
number of removed nodes on the electrical power grid of the western United States from [23] with
N = 4941 nodes and M = 6594 links under attacks.
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